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 Executive Summary 
The federal government currently runs two major price support programs in 
agriculture, the marketing loan and countercyclical payment (CCP) programs. While 
these programs are both targeted at providing producer price protection, they have 
different political and financial costs associated with them. We outline these costs and 
project the effects of various loan rate changes on these programs for eight crops (barley, 
corn, cotton, oats, rice, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat) for 2005. Loan rate changes affect 
the price support programs by changing the payment rate producers receive when 
payments are triggered. We find that the crop’s relative price strength versus its loan rate 
and the relationship between CCP base production and 2005 expected production have 
the largest influence on how loan rate changes affect outlays from the price support 
programs for the various crops.  
Of these crops, cotton is the only one that would be relatively unaffected by loan rate 
shifts. Corn and soybeans would see the largest declines in overall expenditures from 
price support programs if loan rates were decreased. Oats and soybeans would experience 
the largest percentage losses. However, the results also show that the federal government 
could maintain an agricultural price support structure at a lower cost than it is currently 
paying. The reduction in cost often comes in situations where the current array of price 
support programs overcompensates producers for price shortfalls. This shift would also 
likely find greater acceptance under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agriculture 
guidelines than would the current structure. For an administration that is looking to rein 
in deficit spending while at the same time negotiating new WTO guidelines, moving to 
lower loan rates could be an answer. 
 
Keywords: agricultural loan rates, agricultural marketing loan program, agricultural 
price supports, countercyclical payments (CCPs), loan deficiency payments (LDPs). 
 
  
LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS VERSUS COUNTERCYCLICAL PAYMENTS: 
DO WE NEED BOTH FOR A PRICE SAFETY NET? 
 
 
The 2002 farm bill created a new price safety net program based on countercyclical 
payments (CCPs), and maintained an existing price safety net program using marketing 
loans. Both programs pay producers when prices are low. However, the programs differ 
in several respects. Marketing loan benefits (marketing loan gains and loan deficiency 
payments [LDPs]) are paid on current production, accrue when prices fall below the 
prescribed loan rates, and are limited only by the size of the crop and the price level. 
CCPs are paid on a historical base production, accrue when prices are between prescribed 
target prices and loan rates, and are limited by these government-set prices and the 
historical base. 
Thus, the federal government has set up two programs to cover the same problem 
and has structured the rules for these programs to minimize the likelihood of both pro-
grams paying for the same price drop. But does this structure make sense politically or 
financially? Politically, the United States has to defend the two programs in the current 
World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural negotiations. Both programs are viewed as 
trade distorting. Under the existing WTO agriculture agreement, both programs are 
included in the list of programs the United States reports as “amber box” support, or 
agricultural support that is trade distorting and is limited under the WTO. The latest 
WTO agriculture framework separates the two programs. CCPs would become “blue 
box” support, or support that is trade distorting but is paid on a fixed base. Marketing 
loan benefits would remain in the amber box. From this point on, we will refer to market-
ing loan benefits as LDPs, as over 90 percent of marketing loan benefits are captured as 
LDPs. The framework places a cap on blue box support and continues reductions in 
allowed amber box support from the current agriculture agreement. Blue box support is 
considered less trade distorting than is amber box support. Thus, CCPs face less virulent 
opposition from other WTO members than do LDPs, but both programs are opposed by 
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many WTO members. The United States pays a political price in the WTO to maintain 
protection for these programs. 
The U.S. financial outlook has dramatically changed since the passage of the 2002 
farm bill. Going into the 2002 farm bill, the federal government had run budget surpluses 
in the previous four years (1998-2001). These surpluses offered Congress an opportunity 
to expand agricultural programs; this opportunity was not missed. All the major farm 
programs were continued in the bill and two new programs were added: CCPs and the 
Conservation Security Program. Since the farm bill’s passage, budget deficits have 
returned and reached record levels; Congress has reduced funding for the Conservation 
Security Program to pay for disaster assistance programs; and President Bush has stated 
that these deficits will be cut in half by 2009. As discretionary spending on defense and 
homeland security is unlikely to be cut, spending reductions to reduce the deficit will 
have to come from other sources, such as agriculture. 
In this paper, we examine the interaction between CCPs and LDPs, compute the 
budget implications of changing these programs, and discuss the ramifications of 
these changes. To do this, we simulate the expenditures for these programs for the 
upcoming 2005 crop year for eight major crops: barley, corn, cotton, oats, rice, 
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. Expected prices and yields are taken from the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute’s (FAPRI) November 2004 preliminary 
baseline. These expectations are used as the mean values in price and yield distribu-
tions. Random draws from the distributions are combined with data and formulas 
from the farm programs to estimate payments from the two programs. We do not 
consider changes in direct payments because they are not part of the farmer price 
safety net and they are “green box” with respect to the WTO. However, it could be 
that some farm groups might consider reducing direct payments in favor of support 
for LDPs and CCPs. The analysis provided herein gives insight into how much this 
support might cost. 
 
A Deterministic Outlook for 2005 
FAPRI’s preliminary baseline for 2005 has crop yields returning to trend yield levels 
and prices moving accordingly. Table 1 shows the acreage, yield, and production levels 
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projected for 2005. Barley, oat, sorghum, and wheat acreage increases from 2004 levels, 
while corn, cotton, rice, and soybean acreage declines. Given the favorable growing 
conditions in 2004, yields were fairly strong. Several yield records were broken. Project-
ing 2005 at trend yields leads to lower production in 2005, with the exception of oats, 
where the acreage increase balances the yield decline. 
Table 2 shows the FAPRI preliminary baseline projections for the season-average 
price for each of the crops. The projected prices are higher than the projected 2004 prices 
(we are currently in the middle of the marketing season) for barley, corn, cotton, oats, and 
sorghum. Rice, soybeans, and wheat show price declines for the coming crop year. Two 
prices are listed for barley, cotton, and rice. These three crops utilize different prices in 
the CCP and LDP programs. For barley, the all barley price provides a better signal on 
LDP levels, while the feed barley price is used in CCP rate calculations. For cotton and 
rice, LDPs are calculated from adjusted world prices and CCPs are calculated from 
season-average farm prices. 
To compute CCP expenditures for 2005, we hold CCP acreage, yields, and base pro-
duction at crop year 2003 levels, the last year reported. Given these data, the target 
prices, direct payment rates, national loan rates, and the prices in Table 2, CCP rates and 
expenditures for 2005 can be projected. Table 3 shows the CCP base production and 
projected CCP rates and expenditures. The CCP base production in Table 3 is 85 percent 
of the product of CCP base yields and CCP base acres. Given projected prices, corn and 
cotton will receive significant CCP outlays, while barley and oats will receive none. 
 
TABLE 1. Projected 2005 acreage, yield, and production 
Crop Planted Acres 
Harvested 
Acres Yield Production 
 (million acres) (bushels per acre) (million bushels) 
Barley 4.6 4.1 61.7 253 
Corn 80.5 73.0 146.1 10,666 
Oats 4.2 1.9 62.8 118 
Sorghum 8.1 6.7 63.4 *422 
Soybeans 72.9 71.7 39.4 2,821 
Wheat 60.6 51.0 41.8 2,131 
   (pounds per acre) (million pounds) 
Cotton 13.2 11.9 704.0 8,357 
Rice 3.2 3.2 6,799.0 21,460 
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TABLE 2. Projected 2005 crop prices 
Crop Price 
Secondary  
Price Note on Price 
Note on  
Secondary Price 
 ($ per bushel)   
Barley 2.52 2.04 All Barley Price Feed Barley Price 
Corn 2.21 
Oats 1.51 
Sorghum 2.14 
Soybeans 4.63 
Wheat 3.18 
 ($ per pound)   
Cotton 0.436 0.415 Farm Price Adjusted World 
Price 
 ($ per hundredweight)   
Rice 5.96 4.32 Farm Price Adjusted World 
Price 
 
 
TABLE 3. CCP projections for 2005 
Crop CCP Base Production CCP Rate CCP Expenditures 
 (million bushels) ($ per bushel) ($ million) 
Barley 360 0.00 0 
Corn 8,446 0.14 1,182 
Oats 132 0.00 0 
Sorghum 590 0.08 47 
Soybeans 1,530 0.36 551 
Wheat 2,318 0.22 510 
 (million pounds) ($ per pound)  
Cotton 9,998 0.1373 1,373 
  ($ per hundredweight)  
Rice 19,527 1.65 322 
 
For the LDP expenditures, we calculated the average price gap between the season-
average farm price (or adjusted world price for cotton and rice) and the price indicated by 
average LDP rates historically when average LDP rates are positive. Positive LDP rates 
indicate prices are below the loan rate at some point during the crop year, and this can 
occur even when the season-average price is above the loan rate. Given average LDP 
rates for each year, we can determine a national price representing the average price 
when LDPs are taken. This is equal to the national loan rate less the average LDP rate. 
Comparing these prices to the season-average prices for each year, we compute the price 
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difference between the two and average this difference across all years where average 
LDP rates are positive. Table 4 shows the calculation of the corn LDP price gap.  
We subtract this price gap from the 2005 projected prices to calculate projected 
prices for LDP utilization. We then subtract these projected prices from the national crop 
loan rates to determine 2005 projected average LDP rates. Projected LDP expenditures 
are equal to projected production times the projected average LDP rate. Table 5 shows 
the LDP price gap and projected LDP rates and outlays by crop. Soybeans and cotton are 
projected to receive the largest LDP outlays, while corn prices are projected to remain 
above loan rates. 
 
Another Way to Look at Countercyclical versus  
Loan Deficiency Payments 
The deterministic projections just described provide one measure of how CCPs and 
LDPs flow to the various crops. But this measure is dependent on the projected price level. 
Another way to examine the relative value of the programs to each commodity is to 
compare the payment productions for the programs. The difference in the payment produc-
tions is directly related to the difference in payments for a one-cent change in the CCP and 
LDP rates. Table 6 shows the ratio of CCP base production to 2005 expected production 
(LDP base production, if you will). With higher levels of expected production, LDPs 
should be relatively more valuable. Ratios above (below) 100 percent indicate a one-cent 
change in CCP rates is more (less) valuable than a one-cent change in LDP rates. By this  
 
TABLE 4. Corn LDP price gap calculation 
Year 
Season-average 
Price 
National Loan 
Rate 
Average LDP 
Rate 
LDP Price 
Gap 
 ($ per bushel) 
1998 1.94 1.89 0.14 0.19 
1999 1.82 1.89 0.26 0.19 
2000 1.85 1.89 0.26 0.22 
2001 1.97 1.89 0.12 0.20 
2002 2.32 1.98 0.00  
2003 2.42 1.98 0.01 0.45 
2004 1.91 1.95 0.24 0.20 
Average    0.24 
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TABLE 5. LDP price gaps and LDP projections for 2005 
Crop LDP Price Gap LDP Rate LDP Expenditures 
 ($ per bushel) ($ million) 
Barley 0.72 0.05 13 
Corn 0.24 0.00 0 
Oats 0.21 0.03 4 
Sorghum 0.24 0.05 21 
Soybeans 0.27 0.64 1,805 
Wheat 0.47 0.04 85 
 ($ per pound)  
Cotton 0.0140 0.1190 994 
 ($ per hundredweight)  
Rice 0.24 2.42 519 
 
 
TABLE 6. Ratio of CCP production to 2005 expected production 
Crop CCP/2005 Expected 
Barley 1.42 
Corn 0.79 
Cotton 1.20 
Oats 1.12 
Rice 0.91 
Sorghum 1.40 
Soybeans 0.54 
Wheat 1.09 
 
measure, CCPs provide relatively more support for barley, cotton, oats, sorghum, and 
wheat than do LDPs, while LDPs are relatively more important to corn, rice, and soybeans. 
From the Table 6 results, we can see that if producers could exchange one cent of 
CCP rate for one cent of LDP rate or vice versa, then barley, cotton, oat, sorghum, and 
wheat producers would give up a penny on LDPs to get a penny on CCPs, while corn, 
rice, and soybean producers would do the opposite. 
 
Simulating the 2005 Crop Year 
In reality, a one-cent change in LDP rates is not necessarily linked to a one-cent 
change in CCP rates because of the use of different prices and different triggers for 
payment. To further explore the relationship between CCPs and LDPs, we conduct a 
Monte Carlo simulation of the 2005 crop year. The random variables for the simulation 
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are 2005 crop yields and prices. Harvested acreage, target prices, direct payment rates, 
loan rates, CCP base production, and LDP price gaps are taken as given. Of course we do 
not know what the 2005 yields and prices will be, so we have to look at all possible likely 
values and assign each of the values a probability of occurrence. We do this by assuming 
that crop prices follow lognormal distributions with means at projected baseline levels 
and volatilities of 15 percent. National crop yields are assumed to follow normal distribu-
tions with means at projected levels (trend yields) and volatilities of 7.5 percent. Equally 
spaced probability draws, from 0.1 percent to 99.9 percent in 0.1 percent increments, are 
taken from each distribution. Taking draws in this way ensures that the entire distribution 
is adequately represented. The draws (999 for each variable) are then sorted to achieve 
correlation among the prices and yields at historical levels using the Iman-Conover 
procedure. (See their article in Communication Statistics: Simulation and Computation, 
volume 11, 1982, pages 311-334, for more details.) Production, CCP and LDP rates, and 
CCP and LDP expenditures are then calculated from the simulations. 
Table 7 provides the average LDP and CCP rates and expenditures from the simula-
tion. These results differ from the deterministic results in Tables 3 and 5, even though the 
deterministic prices and yields are the mean values for the simulations. For example, the 
deterministic results indicate no barley CCPs for 2005, as the projected feed barley price 
($2.04/bushel) is above the effective target price for barley. (The effective target price, 
$2.00/bushel, is equal to the target price less the direct payment rate, $2.24/bushel - 
$0.24/bushel.) However, there is nearly a 50 percent probability that the feed barley price 
will fall below the effective target price and trigger CCPs. This probability is reflected in 
the average CCP for barley from the simulations. 
 
Trading Loan Deficiency Payments for Countercyclical  
Payments or Vice Versa 
The common link between LDPs and CCPs is the national loan rate for each crop. If 
the federal government wanted to shift to a more WTO-friendly stance while still providing 
price protection, it would lower commodity loan rates and allow the CCP rate to expand 
and fill the potential price gap. As CCPs are paid on a fixed base acreage and yield, they 
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TABLE 7. Simulated average LDP and CCP projections for 2005 
Crop LDP Rate CCP Rate LDP Expenditures CCP Expenditures
     ($ per bushel) ($ million) 
Barley 0.16 0.06 42 20 
Corn 0.12 0.18 1,355 1,539 
Oats 0.11 0.02 13 3 
Sorghum 0.15 0.12 69 73 
Soybeans 0.72 0.29 2,079 437 
Wheat 0.21 0.29 467 664 
     ($ per pound)  
Cotton 0.1216 0.1333 1,013 1,333 
    ($ per hundredweight)  
Rice 2.42 1.50 529 292 
 
are considered less trade distorting than are LDPs, which are paid on current production. In 
forming their opinions about the next farm bill, commodity groups may want to examine 
the trade-off between CCPs and LDPs. To explore the effects of loan rate changes on both 
LDPs and CCPs, we varied the national loan rates for each commodity from 0 to 120 
percent of the current loan rates. All other variables (target prices, direct payment rates, 
etc.) are held fixed. We then utilized the 999 simulations of the 2005 crop yields and prices 
to estimate LDP and CCP expenditures under the various loan rates. 
When the market price is well above the loan rate, a one-cent change in loan rates 
has no impact on either the LDP or CCP rates and associated expenditures. When the 
market price is below the loan rates, a one-cent change in loan rates translates into a 
direct one-cent impact on the CCP and LDP rates. For prices just above the loan rates, a 
one-cent movement in loan rates will likely impact LDP rates without affecting CCP 
rates. This is because LDP rates are based on daily prices. With a season-average price 
close to the loan rate level, it is likely that prices would all below the loan rate for some 
part of the marketing year and producers could utilize the LDP program. Thus, a loan rate 
change is more likely to affect LDP rates than to affect CCP rates. The size of this impact 
can be seen in the following analysis. 
Figure 1 shows aggregate LDP and CCP expenditures for the eight crops as the loan 
rates are varied from 60 percent below to 20 percent above today’s levels. A key assump-
tion that we make throughout the remainder of this analysis is that acreage is held fixed at 
the 2005 projected baseline levels.1 Overall, expenditures decline as loan rates are  
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FIGURE 1. LDP and CCP expected outlays for the eight major crops 
 
reduced to a point at which further reductions have no effect. At current loan rates, LDP 
and CCP expenditures are projected to be nearly $10 billion. If loan rates were increased 
to 120 percent of current levels, the expenditures would increase to $14 billion. Lowering 
loan rates by 6 percent would decrease expected total outlays by approximately $1 
billion. Reducing loan rates by 20 percent would lower LDP and CCP expenditures to $7.5 
billion. Reducing loan rates to 60 percent (or below) of current levels would drop outlays to 
$6.7 billion. 
Figures 2-9 show the LDP and CCP expenditures by crop. For seven of the eight 
crops, combined expenditures for LDPs and CCPs decline as loan rates decrease. The 
exception is cotton. Combined expenditures for cotton are quite insensitive to changes in 
loan rates. There are two reasons for this insensitivity. First, the projected cotton price is 
far below the loan rate. Thus, a drop in the loan rate does not result in a large decrease in 
the probability that LDPs will be received. Second, the CCP base production is larger 
than expected production. Thus, CCPs increase at about the same rate that LDPs de-
crease. The pattern is not just an artifact of cotton program settings, as barley, oats, 
sorghum, and wheat would exhibit similar patterns if their prices were as far below their 
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FIGURE 2. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for barley 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for corn 
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FIGURE 4. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for cotton 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for oats 
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FIGURE 6. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for rice 
 
 
FIGURE 7. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for sorghum 
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FIGURE 8. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for soybeans 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9. LDP and CCP expected expenditures for wheat 
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loan rates as cotton. These crops all have CCP base production that exceeds 2005 ex-
pected production. 
For barley, oats, sorghum, and soybeans, higher loan rates would effectively shut off 
CCPs, as the loan rates would exceed effective target prices. For oats, this happens at 107 
percent of the current loan rate; for barley, sorghum, and soybeans, this happens at 109, 
114, and 108 percent, respectively. For the other crops, CCPs still exist with higher loan 
rates, but the expenditures would be greatly reduced. 
To provide some additional perspective on farm program costs, in Table 8 we show 
projected payments for the direct payment (DP) program, along with the LDP and CCP 
programs. Because CCPs and DPs share base acreage but differ in base yields, their 
marginal value is fairly similar. Their total values differ because of payment rates. 
Besides the loan rate, Congress could adjust target prices or DP rates to create a desired 
balance of support between income support via DPs and price support via LDPs and 
CCPs. Target price adjustments would only affect CCPs, while DP rate adjustments 
would affect both DPs and CCPs. As Table 8 shows, barley and sorghum heavily rely on 
DPs, while cotton, oats, and soybeans derive most of their farm program support from the 
price support programs. 
To see the relative impact of the loan rate changes across crops, we have graphed in 
Figure 10 the percent changes in combined expenditures. The base for the percent 
changes is the 2005 projected expenditures, given current loan rates. The percent change 
for expenditures across the eight crops is also shown. 
 
TABLE 8. LDP, CCP, and DP projections for 2005 
Crop LDP CCP DP 
 ($ million) 
Barley 42 20 85 
Corn 1,355 1,539 2,117 
Cotton 1,013 1,333 631 
Oats 13 3 3 
Rice 529 292 431 
Sorghum 69 73 201 
Soybeans 2,079 437 608 
Wheat 467 664 1,152 
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FIGURE 10. Percent changes in price support program expenditures 
 
The effects of loan rate reductions vary dramatically across crops. Cotton would actu-
ally receive more payments with a 10 percent reduction in loan rates because of its large 
CCP base production and because projected cotton prices are well below the current loan 
rate. Rice payments fall but by only a small amount with a 10 percent reduction because the 
projected rice price is below the loan rate. Rice CCP base production is less than expected 
production so total rice expenditures do fall. With larger loan rate reductions, rice expendi-
tures are reduced similarly to the other program crops. Oats and soybeans would 
experience the greatest percentage loss of support with loan rate declines. Soybean outlays 
fall dramatically with a decline in loan rates even though the projected soybean price is 
well below the loan rate because soybean CCP base production is only 54 percent of 
expected production. Thus, CCPs only increase by half of the drop in LDPs.  
 
When Would Cost Savings Occur? 
In the previous section, we examined the effects of loan rate changes on CCP and 
LDP expenditures. The results showed that for all crops except cotton, a reduction in the 
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commodity loan rate would reduce the total support coming from price support programs. 
But would this reduction severely limit the effectiveness of price support programs? To 
explore this, we calculate market revenues, LDP and CCP expenditures under the current 
structure, and CCP expenditures when the loan rate is set to zero for each of the simula-
tions. We then compare revenue under three scenarios relative to a target amount. For the 
target revenue, we choose the product of 2005 production at trend yields and the effective 
target price from the current CCP program. This target represents a revenue floor that 
Congress has chosen to defend via the price support programs. The three revenue scenar-
ios are revenues derived strictly from the market, revenues from the market and the 
current price support programs, and revenues from the market and a modified CCP 
program in which the loan rate is set to zero. 
Figures 11 and 12 show the revenues that would flow to corn and cotton producers, 
respectively, under the three scenarios for given production levels. In the figures, “Mar-
ket+CCP+LDP” refers to the current price support program structure and 
“Market+AdjCCP” refers to the modified CCP program in which the loan rate is set to 
zero. As can be seen from Figures 11 and 12, either of the government program scenarios 
maintains or raises revenues above the targeted level for a wide range of production 
levels. In fact, for cotton, revenues would fall well short of the targeted level only with no 
government programs. 
Figures 11 and 12 also show where the payment reductions would occur for the two 
crops. For corn, the simulation analysis indicates that corn price support payments would 
fall by 37 percent if the loan rate was reduced to zero. Figure 11 shows that this reduction 
would occur when production exceeded 9.5 billion bushels, and the largest impacts would 
occur at the highest production levels. For the vast majority of these cases, the reductions 
occur when revenues would exceed the targeted level under the current set of current 
programs. Thus, in terms of meeting the goal of stabilizing corn revenues at the targeted 
level, a modified CCP program would do a better job for a lower cost. Figure 11 also shows 
that the current combination of CCPs and LDPs tends to overshoot the target and over-
compensates producers when production is high. This overcompensation can be significant. 
For example, if corn production in 2005 is 12 billion bushels, the average revenue from the  
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FIGURE 11. Corn revenues under various production and program scenarios 
 
 
FIGURE 12. Cotton revenues under various production and program scenarios 
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market and current price support programs would be $29 billion; roughly $6 billion of this 
would come from CCPs and LDPs. So the price support programs would overshoot the 
targeted revenue level by $4 billion. For the modified CCP program, the overshoot would 
still occur, but the amount would be smaller, at roughly $2 billion. 
For cotton, the simulation analysis indicated that cotton price support payments 
would fall by 6 percent if the loan rate was reduced to zero. Figure 12 shows that this 
reduction would occur when production exceeded 7.5 billion bushels, and the largest 
impacts would occur at the highest production levels. But again, a modified CCP pro-
gram would do a better job of maintaining revenues at the targeted level for a lower cost. 
For cotton, all the savings occur when revenues are above the target level. Given these 
results for corn and cotton, one could argue that the price safety net would not be dimin-
ished by a switch from the current programs to a modified CCP program, even as the cost 
to maintain the safety net declines. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The federal government currently runs two major price support programs in agricul-
ture, the marketing loan and CCP programs. While these programs are both targeted at 
providing producers price protection, they have different political and financial costs 
associated with them. In this paper, we outline those costs and project what various loan 
rate changes would mean to these programs for 2005. Loan rate changes affect the price 
support programs by changing the payment rate producers receive in the programs when 
payments are triggered. We find that the impacts differ by crop for several reasons. The 
crop’s relative price strength versus its loan rate and the relationship between CCP base 
production and 2005 expected production have the largest influence on how loan rate 
changes affect outlays for the various crops. Cotton is the only crop that would be rela-
tively unaffected by loan rate shifts. Corn and soybeans would see the largest declines in 
overall expenditures from price support programs if loan rates were decreased. Oats and 
soybeans would experience the largest percentage losses. 
However, the results also show that the federal government could maintain an agri-
cultural price support structure through greater reliance on CCPs and less on LDPs at a 
lower cost than it is currently paying. The reduction in cost often comes in situations in 
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which the current array of price support programs is overcompensating producers for 
price shortfalls. This shift would also likely find greater acceptance under the WTO 
agriculture guidelines than does the current structure. For an administration that is 
looking to rein in deficit spending while at the same time negotiating new WTO guide-
lines, moving to lower loan rates could be an answer.
  
Endnote 
1. Acreage effects from loan rate changes depend on a number of key factors, includ-
ing the magnitude of the loan rate change and whether all loan rates are changed at 
the same time and the same magnitude, or whether a single loan rate is changed. 
The objective of this briefing paper is to explore the trade-offs that would occur be-
tween LDPs and CCPs, not to analyze a specific policy proposal. Hence, accounting 
for acreage effects is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
